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NOTE
A Comprehensive Administrative Solution to the
Armed Career Criminal Act Debacle
Avi M. Kupfer*
For thirty years, the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) has imposed a
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence on those people convicted as felons
in possession of a firearm or ammunition who have three prior convictions for
a violent felony or serious drug offense. Debate about the law has existed
mainly within a larger discussion on the normative value of mandatory minimums. Assuming that the ACCA endures, however, administering it will continue to be a challenge. The approach that courts use to determine whether
past convictions qualify as ACCA predicate offenses creates ex ante uncertainty
and the potential for intercourt disparities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s
guidance on sentencing ACCA defendants has been unclear. The resulting ambiguity creates inequity between defendants and fails to give them fair warning of the statute’s scope. This ambiguity also depletes the resources of courts,
defendants, and prosecutors and prevents the statute from realizing its full
potential of deterring violent crime. This Note argues that rather than allowing this debacle to continue, Congress should delegate to a federal agency
the task of compiling a binding list of state statutes that qualify as predicate
offenses. Under this approach, the states would assist the federal agency by
providing initial guidance on their ambiguous statutes. The U.S. Sentencing
Commission has the manpower, subject familiarity, and institutional incentives to build and maintain the appendix, and state sentencing commissions
would make ideal partners. In states that do not have sentencing commissions,
comparable agencies and even properly incentivized attorneys general may be
able to aid the federal Sentencing Commission. Congress should leverage this
undertaking to resolve related definitional questions about the meaning of a
violent crime in other areas of federal law.
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Introduction
The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), a federal criminal sentencing statute codified in a few brief sentences, has attracted substantial attention from the Supreme Court. Most ACCA cases would probably never be
appealed were it not for the statute’s life-altering impact—a fifteen-year
mandatory minimum sentence for felons found in possession of a firearm or
ammunition who have three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or
“serious drug offense.”1
Although judges sentence relatively few offenders under the statute,2
frustrated courts, defendants, and prosecutors expend considerable resources on ACCA trials and appeals.3 Broad and imprecise statutory language as well as cryptic Supreme Court interpretations have predictably
1. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).
2. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal
Criminal Justice System 282–84 (2011) [hereinafter Mandatory Minimum Report], available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_
Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm (showing that of over 70,000 offenders analyzed, only 489 of 592 offenders who qualified for the
ACCA enhancement in 2010 were sentenced under it). Over 5,600 individuals, or approximately 3 percent of federal inmates, qualify for the sentencing enhancement. Id. at 288. As this
Note discusses, it is not completely clear which statutes count toward sentencing under the
ACCA, but U.S. Sentencing Commission data should provide a rough estimate.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011) (Agee, J., concurring in the judgment, concurring in the en banc majority opinion, and concurring in the
opinion of Keenan, J.) (“The dockets of our court and all federal courts are now clogged with
[ACCA] cases.”); 156 Cong. Rec. S10,516 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Arlen
Specter) (lamenting “costly and time-consuming [ACCA] litigation at every level of the Federal court system”); Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, and
Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy and Legislation, Dep’t of Justice, to Patti Saris,
Judge, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (July 23, 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20120815/DOJ_Annual%20Letter_priorities_comment.pdf (reflecting on substantial resources U.S. Attorneys Offices expend litigating the issue
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created confusion over the ACCA’s scope. As a result, defendants routinely
challenge its application. Even among offenders convicted of crimes carrying
mandatory minimum penalties—a group that proceeds to trial at nearly
twice the federal average for criminal defendants4—those sentenced under
the ACCA are nearly three times as likely to get to trial.5
The ACCA’s ambiguous reach stems mainly from uncertainty over
which convictions count as ACCA predicate offenses. Three convictions for
a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense” qualify felons in possession for
sentencing under the ACCA,6 but the statute imprecisely defines these terms,
and there is particular confusion about the meaning of a violent felony. The
ACCA lays out two ways that a conviction can be a violent felony predicate
offense. It can have an element that involves “the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”7 Alternatively, it can be “burglary, arson, or extortion, involve[ ] use of explosives, or
otherwise involve[ ] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.”8 The “otherwise” catchall tacked onto the second prong
of the violent felony definition is known as the residual clause. Its breadth is
a source of substantial judicial confusion and academic debate.9
Unclear guidance from the Supreme Court on how sentencing courts
should decide when a given conviction counts as an ACCA predicate offense
contributes to the statute’s ill-defined outer limits. The Court has directed
federal judges to use a categorical approach to resolve whether a past conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. Thus, sentencing courts must determine if the elements of the statute under which the offender was
convicted—rather than the underlying behavior that resulted in that conviction—amount to a violent felony or serious drug offense. This creates the
potential for significant variance among lower courts.10
of whether specific statutes are predicate ACCA offenses). Members of the Supreme Court
have been vocal about their frustration with the considerable energy spent interpreting statutes
under the ACCA. See, e.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (speculating that the Supreme Court will be analyzing state offenses under the
ACCA “until the cows come home”); United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 404 (2008)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (predicting that sentencing courts applying the ACCA “will face highly
complicated enquiries” into the laws of every jurisdiction of predicate offense conviction).
4. Compare Mark Motivans, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Federal Justice Statistics 2009 – Statistical Tables 18–19 (2012) (finding that 3.2%
(3,140) of federal criminal defendants proceeded to trial between October 1, 2008, and September 30, 2009), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09st.pdf, with
Mandatory Minimum Report, supra note 2, at 284 (finding that 5.9% of federal offenders
convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty proceeded to trial in 2010).
5. In 2010, 17.4% of ACCA defendants went to trial. Mandatory Minimum Report,
supra note 2, at 284.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
7. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
8. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
9. See infra Section I.C.
10. See infra Section I.A.
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The related issue of the methods that sentencing courts use to decide
whether a statute categorically qualifies as an ACCA predicate has generated
similar uncertainty. The Court has held that when a single statute contains
alternative elements, judges may use a modified version of the categorical
approach to establish whether the conviction was for an ACCA predicate
offense, a method that allows judges to consult certain court documents
from the previous conviction.11 But the Court is still responding to complications in applying this modified categorical approach. Just last year, it held
in Descamps v. United States that the modified approach should be used only
when a single statute explicitly lists alternative elements.12
Despite the serious consequences that confusion over the ACCA creates
for courts, prosecutors, and defendants,13 Congress has not demonstrated an
interest in narrowing or better defining the statute’s scope.14 Yet ACCA
scholarship that does not enter into the broader debate on the normative
value of mandatory minimums15 largely focuses either on reading the tea
leaves of Supreme Court opinions or suggesting piecemeal statutory improvements.16 No one has advocated for a comprehensive solution to the
ACCA quandary. Perhaps the most far-reaching proposal has come from
Justice Alito: in a recent concurrence, he recommended that Congress create
a list of crimes that count toward the ACCA’s sentencing enhancement.17
Although it remains an incomplete solution,18 Justice Alito’s suggestion reflects the need for more clarity about which felonies count as ACCA predicate offenses.
This Note proposes such a comprehensive solution. In order to compile
a binding list of statutes that qualify as predicate felonies under the ACCA,
Congress should delegate the task to a federal agency working in tandem
with state actors. The Note outlines this proposal in three stages. Part I recounts the confusion created by delegating the ACCA’s interpretative authority to judges. As Part II discusses, this confusion has resulted in negative
consequences for courts, prosecutors, and defendants, and it vitiates the
statute’s ability to deter violent crime. Part III then argues that, given the
unlikelihood that Congress will repeal, narrow, or clarify the ACCA itself, it
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281–82 (2013).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
15. For a general background on the history, debate surrounding, and current use of
federal mandatory minimums, see Mandatory Minimum Report, supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual Clause
of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 209 (2010); James G. Levine, Note, The
Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46
Harv. J. on Legis. 537 (2009); Isham M. Reavis, Comment, Driving Dangerously: Vehicle
Flight and the Armed Career Criminal Act After Sykes v. United States, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 281
(2012).
17. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 134 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
18. See infra Section III.D.
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should delegate to a federal agency the task of defining what counts as a
predicate offense—a move that would substantially reduce the current system’s negative consequences. Specifically, Congress should direct the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to compile an appendix of every state felony that
qualifies as an ACCA predicate, with assistance from the states in providing
initial nonbinding guidance on ambiguous statutes. Finally, Congress should
take advantage of this ambitious initiative to resolve related definitional
questions about the meaning of a violent crime in other areas of federal law.
I. Confusion Applying the ACCA
This Part discusses the major sources of confusion over which statutes
qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA. Section I.A explains why,
under the categorical approach, ex ante certainty about whether a given statute is an ACCA predicate is improbable. The inevitable result is intercourt
disparities in how similar offenses are treated. Section I.B demonstrates that
unanswered questions about applying the modified categorical approach
could also lead to disparate results. Lastly, Section I.C shows that the
residual clause’s scope is unclear because the Supreme Court has inconsistently defined a violent felony under the ACCA.
A. The Categorical Approach
When Congress passed the ACCA as part of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, it did not include directions on how judges should decide whether
the previous convictions of a felon in possession were violent felonies or
serious drug offenses.19 In 1990, the Supreme Court attempted to provide
clarity for courts by directing them to use a categorical approach when sentencing under the ACCA.20 The categorical approach itself is a simple concept. Sentencing courts consider the elements of the prior statute under
which the felon in possession was convicted—rather than the behavior that
resulted in the conviction—and decide if the statute categorically amounts
to a violent felony.21
Applying the categorical approach to criminal activities that are actually
enumerated in the ACCA is relatively straightforward. In Taylor v. United
States, the Court had to consider whether conviction under a particular burglary statute amounted to the ACCA predicate offense of burglary.22 It asked
whether the statute in question carried the “basic elements” of burglary’s
“uniform definition” in the “generic sense.”23 While the Court declined to
19. See Levine, supra note 16, at 545–48, for a background on the ACCA’s legislative
history.
20. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588–90 (1990).
21. See id. at 590, 600 (holding that sentencing courts should analyze past offenses
through a categorical approach, considering only the fact of conviction and the “statutory
definitions of the prior offenses”).
22. Id. at 578–80.
23. Id. at 598–99.
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precisely define this term, it did suggest that the term “roughly correspond[s] to the definitions of burglary in a majority of the States’ criminal
codes.”24 The Court used this approach as a guideline to construe the elements of generic burglary. It rejected the common law definition of burglary
that several states still used25 as well as a narrow definition that only captured a particularly dangerous subclass of burglaries.26 Rather, the Court
adopted a generic definition used in most states and approximated in the
Model Penal Code: “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in,
a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.”27 To determine
whether a given statute is categorically burglary under the ACCA, judges
need only compare its elements to those of generic burglary as defined by
the Taylor Court.
Applying the categorical approach to crimes that are not enumerated in
the ACCA but that still may qualify as predicate offenses yields results that
are more unpredictable.28 Many statutes clearly are or are not violent felonies or serious drug offenses. For more ambiguous statutes, however, it is
impossible to predict whether they will qualify as ACCA predicate offenses
before a particular court issues its ruling because the Supreme Court does
not issue advisory opinions. Therefore, unless the Court definitively holds
that a statute is not an ACCA predicate offense, it is impossible to know with
certainty whether a lower court will find that it qualifies as a violent felony.29
Receiving a conclusive judicial answer to whether each gray-area statute is a
predicate offense is infeasible. Federal courts would need to issue enough
ACCA sentences to reach each ambiguous statute in every U.S. jurisdiction.
All of the convicted felons would need to appeal their sentences, appellate
courts would need to uphold the convictions, and the Supreme Court would
then need to grant certiorari and issue opinions in every one of these cases.
Of course, whenever a state amends one of its existing criminal statutes or
creates a new criminal offense, this same process would need to repeat itself.
Confusion created by the categorical approach is exacerbated by the fact
that nothing prevents federal courts from issuing conflicting judgments
about the same statute. A felon in possession convicted in Michigan, for
example, may have a previous state conviction in Tennessee that the federal
judge sitting in Michigan believes is an ACCA predicate offense. There is no
guarantee, however, that a federal court in Arizona considering that Tennessee statute will reach the same conclusion as did the Michigan judge.
24. Id. at 589.
25. Id. at 593–96.
26. Id. at 596–97.
27. Id. at 598.
28. See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of divergences among courts interpreting similar statutes.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
Oregon’s first-degree burglary statute is broader than the Supreme Court’s definition of generic burglary in Taylor but nonetheless qualifies as a violent felony through the ACCA’s
residual clause).
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B. The Modified Categorical Approach
The Supreme Court has recognized that the categorical approach is insufficient for analyzing more complex criminal statutes that cover a range of
conduct, only some of which qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense.30 In
these cases, sentencing courts may use a modified categorical approach to
“go beyond the mere fact of conviction” and consider documents from the
original trial to determine if the defendant was convicted of the elements of
a generic ACCA offense.31 Judges may consult specific documents in conducting this analysis, including the terms of the plea agreement or charging
document, a transcript of the colloquy if the defendant confirmed the factual basis for the plea, or “some comparable judicial record of this information.”32 Most recently, the Court held that the modified categorical approach
should be used only when a statute explicitly lists alternative elements.33 This
holding strongly affirmed that the ACCA predicate offense question is a statutory inquiry independent of the underlying behavior that resulted in the
previous convictions.
Despite these clarifying decisions, courts may still apply the modified
categorical approach unevenly because of many lingering uncertainties. It is
unclear, for example, what constitutes the “comparable judicial record” that
sentencing judges are allowed to examine.34 In some jurisdictions, a charging
document—one of the acceptable records for determining whether a past
conviction was for an ACCA predicate offense—requires prosecutors to allege nonelemental facts.35 A guilty plea based on the contents of a charging
document may therefore amount to an admission of a fact beyond the statute’s elements. The predicate felony could also result from a plea of no contest to charges brought under a divisible statute. A sentencing court would
normally apply the modified categorical approach to discern which of the
statute’s elements the fact finder determined in the original case. It is unclear how this would work when the defendant’s plea does not admit guilt to
any of the statute’s alternative elements.36 In addition, the Court explicitly
30. A court would presumably use the modified categorical approach in two situations.
The government may posit that conviction under a divisible statute required proving the elements of an ACCA violent felony offense enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). See, e.g.,
United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 2011). The government could also argue
that conviction under a divisible statute required proving elements that constitute a violent
felony or serious drug offense, even though the elements do not comprise one of the enumerated ACCA crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Bethea, 603 F.3d 254, 259–60 (4th Cir. 2010).
31. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
32. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
33. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013) (California burglary statute
had a fixed number of elements, none of which required proving unlawful entry).
34. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; Thomas W. Hutchison et al., Federal Sentencing
Law and Practice § 4B1.2, at 1351–54 (2014 ed.) (describing how Shepard left unsettled—
and circuits have reached divergent results on—whether courts using the modified categorical
approach may examine certain court documents).
35. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2301 (Alito, J., dissenting).
36. See Hutchison et al., supra note 34, § 4B1.2 cmt. 3(c)(iii)(F).
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left unanswered whether judges may take into account binding holdings
from the convicting jurisdiction when deciding whether a statute lists alternative elements.37 A clever prosecutor relying on precedent from the convicting jurisdiction could convince the sentencing court that the statute contains
alternative elements and that the elements for which the offender was convicted constitute a violent felony.
Each of these potential application problems may seem trivial in isolation. Taken together, however, they represent a web of ambiguity that could
exacerbate the categorical approach’s drawbacks—unpredictability as to
whether a statute constitutes an ACCA predicate offense and, possibly, divergent lower court rulings. As Justice Alito has stated, the modified categorical approach is “extremely complicated, and occasionally produces results
that seem to make no sense whatsoever.”38
C. The Residual Clause’s Competing Interpretations
Using the categorical—or modified categorical—approach, sentencing
courts must frequently consider whether a statute “involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”39 and therefore amounts to a violent felony predicate offense under the ACCA’s
residual clause. In recent cases, the Supreme Court has failed to advance a
coherent test regarding the residual clause’s scope. From 2007 to 2011, three
different justices writing for the Court offered competing tests for applying
the residual clause. In a debate that exemplifies the Roberts Court’s minimalist–formalist divisions, none of these views has gained traction.40
The Court’s first attempt to explain the residual clause came when Alphonso James challenged an Eleventh Circuit decision that his conviction
under a Florida attempted burglary statute was an ACCA predicate felony.41
Writing for a bare majority, Justice Alito found that the residual clause applied because the risk of physical injury that attempted burglary presents “in
the ordinary case”42 is comparable to that of burglary, its “closest analog
among the enumerated offenses.”43 The Court reasoned that attempted burglary presents the same type of risk of physical injury as burglary, it noted
that every appellate court construing an attempted burglary statute had held
that the crime qualified as an ACCA predicate, and it also referenced the
37. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2291.
38. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (No. 11-9540).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
40. See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 355
(2007). Justices Alito, Breyer, and Kennedy have authored opinions with differing residual
clause interpretations. Justice Scalia has urged a distinct approach in several dissents and concurrences. In addition to these competing explanations, Justice Thomas consistently writes
separate concurrences or dissents in favor of overruling Almendarez–Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224 (1998).
41. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 196–97 (2007).
42. Id. at 208.
43. Id. at 203.
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Sentencing Commission’s classification of attempted burglary as a crime of
violence.44 The Court relied on these arguments to conclude that conviction
under Florida’s attempted burglary statute was a violent felony.
The James Court’s solution, however, fails as a panacea for all residual
clause cases. Its dicta suggest both that the statute under consideration must
pose a comparable level of risk to its closest enumerated analog45 and that it
need not be “as great a risk as any of the enumerated offenses.”46 Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s dissent, in which he was joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, accurately captures the inherent difficulty of applying the closest
analog test to crimes that present a risk of physical injury yet are not comparable to any of the enumerated offenses.47 Sexual assault and evading arrest
statutes, for example, are hardly akin to any of the listed ACCA offenses, but
they may still present a serious potential risk of physical injury.48 Justice
Scalia suggested that a statute should qualify as a predicate offense through
the residual clause when the behavior that it punishes poses as much risk of
serious physical injury as burglary, the “least risky” enumerated offense.49
But his alternative failed to gain traction and has therefore been relegated to
dissents and concurrences.
Barely five months after Justices Alito and Scalia offered competing
residual clause interpretations in James, a new five-justice grouping offered
yet another residual clause interpretative approach in Begay v. United
States.50 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer reasoned that a New Mexico
felony DUI was not an ACCA violent felony because it did not punish “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”51 When the Court considered the
residual clause less than a year later in Chambers v. United States, Justice
Breyer again wrote for the majority.52 The Court applied the same purposeful, violent, and aggressive test from Begay to hold that an Illinois failure to report statute was not a violent felony.53

44. Id. at 203–07.
45. Id. at 203.
46. Id. at 209.
47. Id. at 219–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that Arizona
sexual assault conviction is an ACCA predicate); United States v. Brown, 516 F. App’x 461 (6th
Cir. 2013) (finding that Tennessee evading arrest conviction is an ACCA predicate).
49. James, 550 U.S. at 225 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. 553 U.S. 137, 138 (2008).
51. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145.
52. 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
53. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 138.
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On pure lenity grounds, the purposeful, violent, and aggressive test was
an improvement because by narrowing the broad residual clause, it inherently resolved ambiguities in favor of defendants.54 The test’s language, however, may be as vague as that of the residual clause itself.55 Furthermore, the
Chambers Court relied heavily on recent U.S. Sentencing Commission data
to hold that failure to report was not purposeful, violent, and aggressive.56
The inconsistent use and availability of reliable empirical evidence in making similar judicial determinations could lead to divergent interpretations
across statutes.57
Yet Chambers represented a high-water mark in residual clause clarity.
In consecutive opinions concluding with Chambers, the Court relied—at
least rhetorically—on a single approach to decide whether an offense constituted a violent felony. And in the latter case, seven justices coalesced around
Justice Breyer’s test.58 But confidence in the staying power of this unified
approach59 was frustrated by the Court’s most recent residual clause case.
After being convicted as a felon in possession, Marcus Sykes argued that a
previous Indiana conviction for vehicular flight did not qualify as a violent
felony under the ACCA.60 Borrowing from each of the Court’s previous
residual clause opinions, Justice Kennedy held that the vehicular flight statute was a violent felony. The Court found support in Justice Alito’s comparative risk test from James61 and relied on statistical data, much like the
Chambers Court did.62 Yet the Sykes Court asserted that the vehicular flight
statute was not subject to Chambers’s purposeful, violent, and aggressive
test. It found that the Chambers test has little utility beyond explaining why
a crime of strict liability, negligence, or recklessness may not qualify as an
ACCA predicate.63
54. Cf. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885,
893 (2004) (arguing that narrowing interpretive scope is consistent with lenity).
55. See, e.g., Holman, supra note 16, at 224–28.
56. See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128–30.
57. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Supreme Court and the Regulation of Risk in Criminal
Law Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 171, 218 (2012).
58. The most bullish sign of consensus was Justice Scalia’s joining the majority and
abandoning his calls to use a risky-as-the-least-risky test for residual clause offenses, which he
first advanced in James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 218–19 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
and urged again in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 149–50 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment). But cf. Michael M. O’Hear, Mandatory Minimums: Don’t Give Up on the
Court, 2011 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 67, 84–85, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/
Joomla1.5/content/denovo/OHEAR_2011_67.pdf (arguing that consensus in Chambers was
the result of an “incompletely theorized agreement” between Justices Breyer and Scalia).
59. See, e.g., Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., R41449, Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. 924(e)): An Overview 3 (2010) (concluding based on the Chambers and
Begay holdings that the residual clause applies only to offenses marked by purposeful, violent,
and aggressive conduct).
60. United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334, 337–38 (2010).
61. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273–74 (2011).
62. Id. at 2274.
63. See id. at 2276.

October 2014]

An Administrative Solution to the ACCA Debacle

161

The two dissenting opinions epitomized the divided Court’s inability
over four successive decisions to craft a coherent test for applying the
residual clause. Criticizing the majority’s ostensible abandonment of the
purposeful, violent, and aggressive test, Justice Scalia proclaimed the residual
clause a drafting failure that should be declared void for vagueness.64 A less
portentous dissent by Justice Kagan downplayed the Court’s apparent devaluation of the purposeful, violent, and aggressive test, which she “assume[d] . . . will make a resurgence.”65 The Court’s confused jurisprudence
makes it less likely that sentencing courts will achieve uniformity when considering borderline statutes that potentially qualify as ACCA violent felony
predicates through the residual clause.66
II. The Negative Consequences of Judicial Delegation
The previous Part discussed the ambiguity created by the categorical
approach’s inherent indefiniteness, by the unanswered questions about the
modified categorical approach, and by the Supreme Court’s confusing guidance on the residual clause. This Part explains why that confusion is harmful to the courts, prosecutors, and defendants who must grapple with the
ACCA, and why the confusion may detract from the statute’s potential to
deter crime.
Section II.A details how courts, prosecutors, and defendants are forced
to expend limited resources during trial and on appeal to establish whether
individual statutes qualify as ACCA predicate offenses. Section II.B explains
the current system’s consequences for defendants, noting in particular that
disparity in courts’ treatment of similar statutes breeds inequity. In addition,
defendants do not have fair warning of the potential punitive consequences
of committing predicate offenses and later deciding to carry a firearm. Defendants are likewise uninformed about the repercussions of a guilty plea
after being charged either with committing a predicate offense or being a
felon in possession. Finally, Section II.C argues that since defendants are
unaware of the ACCA’s scope, the full extent of its ability to deter violent
crime is left unrealized.
A. Court, Defendant, and Prosecutor Resources
Federal judges generally believe that the ACCA appropriately sentences
the offenders to whom it is applied.67 Yet the energy-intensive process of
64. Id. at 2284–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 2289 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning that “[t]he residual-clause series will
be endless”).
67. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Results of Survey of United States District
Judges January 2010 through March 2010 tbl. 1 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf (showing that
59 percent (566) of federal judge survey respondents felt that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) was appropriate).
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analyzing past convictions depletes resources and irritates judges because
every court must come to its own determination on each statute that potentially qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense.68 Without additional clarity
from Congress, federal judges will have no choice but to continue this piecemeal categorical approach, attempting to conjure meaning from confusing
and sometimes contradictory Supreme Court precedent in order to sort
state statutes.69
Prosecutors and defendants will also benefit from an ACCA modification that exhaustively clarifies which statutes are predicate felonies. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) supports using mandatory minimums as a tool
for maintaining “predictability, certainty, and uniformity” in the discretionary federal sentencing system.70 Yet the categorical approach for classifying
past convictions has led to lengthy sentencing hearings and appeals that
strain the resources of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.71 The DOJ believes that this
could be avoided by clarifying the statute’s scope.72
B. Implications for Defendants
Defendants suffer the most when the ACCA’s ambiguity makes it difficult to predict whether a conviction will count as a predicate offense. Most
obviously, this creates inequity when judges inevitability disagree on how
similar statutes should be classified,73 a situation that has undesirable normative implications for defendants. Federal sentencing courts must attempt
68. See supra Part I; see also United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Agee, J., concurring in the judgment, concurring in the en banc majority opinion, and concurring in the opinion of Keenan, J.) (noting that the residual clause has created “judicial
morass”); United States v. Oliveira, 798 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting that the
residual clause ambiguity is “troubling”).
69. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 216 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Matthew Axelrod, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Statement at U.S. Sentencing Commission Hearing on Federal Sentencing Options After Booker:
Current State of Federal Sentencing 13 (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_16_Axelrod.pdf.
71. See Breuer & Wroblewski, supra note 3, at 8 (expressing concern for resources needed
to litigate ACCA cases under categorical approach).
72. Id.
73. Even beyond statutes whose classification divides the Supreme Court, see supra Section I.C, lower courts have struggled to reach agreement on whether ambiguous statutes qualify as ACCA predicates. See, e.g., Hutchison et al., supra note 34, § 4B1.2 cmt. 3(e)(iii)(C)
(discussing circuit split on whether burglary of a building other than a dwelling is a per se
violent crime); id. § 4B1.2 cmt. 3(e)(xxiv) (discussing a circuit split on resisting arrest); Jeffrey
C. Bright, Violent Felonies Under the Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act:
Whether Carrying a Concealed Handgun Without a Permit Should Be Considered a Violent Felony, 48 Duq. L. Rev. 601 (2010) (discussing circuit split over whether concealed handgun
presents serious risk of physical injury to another); Sarena M. Holder, Note, Resolving the PostBegay Maelstrom: Statutory Rape as a Violent Felony Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 60
Clev. St. L. Rev. 507 (2012); Brett T. Runyon, Comment, ACCA Residual Clause: Strike Four?
The Court’s Missed Opportunity to Create a Workable Residual Clause Violent Felony Test, 51
Washburn L.J. 447, 459 (2012) (noting Eleventh Circuit’s “distinction between a flight statute
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to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.74 Theoretically, the categorical
approach’s singular focus on statutory elements achieves complete sentencing uniformity between defendants by ignoring defendant-specific factors,
such as offender characteristics and offense circumstances.75 But intercourt
disagreement could result in vastly divergent periods of incarceration for
defendants convicted under the same criminal statute. Any disparity in how
sentencing courts treat statutes with similar elements when classifying
ACCA predicate offenses creates inequity for convicted felons in possession.
In addition to diminishing parity between defendants, the current system leaves individual offenders without fair warning. The Supreme Court
has essentially rejected the argument that defendants lack notice that certain
criminal offenses will count as ACCA predicates.76 Yet the ACCA’s ambiguity
may leave defendants with little more than a murky sense of whether a conviction will carry severe future punitive consequences.
Fair warning matters at several different points during the criminal process. First, knowing that conviction under a given state statute will count
toward the ACCA enhancement fundamentally affects a defendant’s decision
to plead guilty in both the state case and the federal felon in possession case.
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of a defendant’s ability
to comprehend the collateral consequences of accepting a plea agreement. In
the case of aliens, for example, the Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that
given the stakes, competent counsel must advise on “the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea.”77 This basic logic holds true
in the ACCA context. Were the collateral implications of a guilty plea clear,
the same Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel concerns that
that requires reckless driving and a statute that does not place [the latter] out of the reach of
Sykes’s holding, so Sykes did not resolve the circuit split”). Compare United States v. Thornton,
554 F.3d 443 (4th Cir. 2009) (statutory rape does not qualify as ACCA violent felony), with
United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260 (1st Cir. 2006) (unlawful sexual contact qualifies as
ACCA violent felony). Compare United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2013) (possession of sawed-off shotgun is not ACCA violent felony), with United States v. Fortes, 141 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 1998) (possession of sawed-off shotgun is ACCA violent felony).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012).
75. Compare the offense-specific nature of the categorical approach with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), which requires federal courts to consider “the history and characteristics of the
defendant” during sentencing.
76. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 209 (2007) (rejecting the argument that
lower courts have insufficient guidance to determine which unenumerated offenses constitute
violent felonies); see also United States v. Carrigan, 724 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that
the absence of precedent alerting defendant that a resisting arrest statute was a predicate did
not render the ACCA unconstitutionally ambiguous or warrant applying the rule of lenity),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 668 (2013). But see Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s evolving interpretation “will keep defendants
. . . guessing”); James, 550 U.S. at 216 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court’s responsibility to derive rules of application that provide notice to defendants); United States v. Mobley,
687 F.3d 625, 636 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting) (arguing that residual clause ambiguity and court-created confusion left an inmate with insufficient notice that possessing a shank
constitutes a crime of violence under the ACCA), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 888 (2013).
77. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
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guided the Court’s decision in Padilla would apply to the ACCA.78 There is a
fundamental need for ACCA defendants to appreciate the possible collateral
legal consequences of pleading guilty for the initial state offenses as well as
for the federal felon in possession statute.79
The lack of fair warning also limits the extent to which defendants know
the penal implications of their criminal activity. For certain crimes, it is not
inherently obvious that the ACCA will apply,80 especially under the Court’s
ever-evolving definition of the residual clause. Since the ACCA’s scope is
unclear, defendants lack fair warning about the implications of the decision
to commit state offenses that may count as ACCA predicates. When these
felons are later convicted for ACCA predicate offenses, they may be unaware
of the serious implications of carrying a firearm—far more serious than the
ten-year maximum sentence that courts otherwise impose on convicted
felons in possession.81
C. The ACCA’s Potential to Deter Crime
Since defendants lack awareness of the potentially severe consequences
of committing a predicate felony or later deciding to carry a firearm, the
goal of using the ACCA’s harsh penalty to deter violent crime is less well
served. Congress’s original aim in enacting the statute may have been to
incapacitate career criminals rather than to deter future violent and drugrelated crime.82 Yet to the extent that the federal penal code is animated at
least in part by utilitarian goals, effective punishment should have the
“power to produce an effect upon the will, and . . . [a] tendency towards the
prevention of like acts.”83 For the enhanced ACCA punishment to serve the
78. In Padilla, failure to inform a client that pleading guilty carried a risk of deportation
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel only because the consequence of the plea was
clear. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. Similarly, the consequences would presumably be clear for
failure to advise on the possible repercussions of pleading guilty to violating a state statute
enumerated in an appendix of ACCA predicate offenses or of pleading guilty to the federal
felon in possession offense with three previous convictions under statutes listed in the
appendix.
79. See, e.g., Nick Poli, Three Strikes and You’re Out . . . Maybe: “Violent Felonies” and the
Armed Career Criminal Act in United States v. Vann, 54 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 201, 214 (2013),
http://bclawreview.org/files/2013/04/15_Poli.pdf.
80. Compare, e.g., United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 983 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for rule of lenity because it is unclear if the ACCA would apply to drunk
driving), with Butler v. O’Brien, 663 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2011) (person of average intelligence would have been on notice that aggravated rape presented risk of physical injury for
purpose of sentencing enhancement), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2748 (2012).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012).
82. See Levine, supra note 16.
83. 2 Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation 322 (photo. reprint 1999) (Richard
Hildreth trans., Boston, Weeks, Jordan & Co. 1840) (1802). Although this Note does not enter
the debate on relative sentence severity’s ability to deter crime, the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence does not exist in a vacuum. Any deterrence-based policy argument advocating
for additional clarity on which crimes are ACCA predicates inherently takes the position that
this would have a greater impact on a felon’s choice to carry a firearm than the lesser sanctions
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goal of deterring crime, potential offenders must be made more aware of the
collateral consequences of committing violent felonies or serious drug offenses and later carrying a firearm.84
III. The ACCA Appendix
The previous Part explained the ways in which the current ad hoc approach to defining predicate felonies has unintended negative consequences
for courts, prosecutors, and defendants and potentially weakens the ACCA
as a deterrent of violent crime. Despite these ramifications, Congress has not
indicated any intention to restrict the scope of this tough-on-crime statute85
or more clearly define its language.86 Assigning interpretative authority to an
agency would allow Congress to avoid the potential fallout from moderating
the ACCA87 while mitigating the current approach’s negative consequences.
Congress should delegate to a federal agency the task of creating and maintaining a binding appendix of state laws that qualify as ACCA predicate offenses. The U.S. Sentencing Commission is well positioned to assume this
substantial responsibility and can do so with support from state actors, who
can provide initial nonbinding guidance on their jurisdictions’ ambiguous
statutes.
Section III.A explains why delegating to an agency—and to the Sentencing Commission in particular—is warranted. Section III.B then discusses the
that otherwise apply to the offense. Compare Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster,
Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 Crime & Just. 143, 187 (2003)
(noting that more severe sentences do not have a differential deterrent effect), with Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 173, 198, 200–205 (2004) (implying that an increased sentence may
deter in some circumstances). The deterrence argument, however, is not essential to this
Note’s proposal because it is one of several justifications for creating the appendix.
84. See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 Stan. L.
Rev. 37, 52 (2005) (concluding that “certainty . . . of punishment [is a] much more powerful
deterrent[ ] than severity”).
85. See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. S10,516–17 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter) (expressing dissatisfaction about ACCA Supreme Court decisions that “severely
limited its reach” by “too narrowly restrict[ing] the Act’s definition of violent crime”). Even
the most recent congressional proposal to give courts complete discretion to impose sentences
below statutorily prescribed minimums would still depend on the ACCA as a default rule.
S. 619, 113th Cong. (2013).
86. See generally David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice for the Administrative
State, 89 Geo. L.J. 97, 135–38 (2000) (explaining that it is difficult for Congress to legislate
with specificity due to its political cost).
87. See generally Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of Bill Stuntz, in The Political Heart of Criminal Procedure 64, 66–81 (Michael
Klarman et al. eds., 2012). Scholars debate the precise causes of federal overcriminalization,
and political motivation is just one of many explanations. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice
Theory and Overcriminalization 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 715, 729–32 (2013) (survey of
various explanations for overcriminalization). Although that discussion is outside of this
Note’s scope, to the extent that congressional inaction on the ACCA is the result of the political incentive for harsh criminal punishments, the agency delegation solution provides Congress with an escape hatch.

166

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 113:151

standard that the Sentencing Commission should use to decide whether statutes qualify as ACCA predicate offenses. Section III.C describes the benefits
of working with state actors to classify ambiguous statutes, and Section III.D
highlights the deficiencies of the existing proposals to list ACCA predicate
offenses. Lastly, Section III.E demonstrates how Congress can leverage the
appendix to resolve related questions in other areas of federal law.
A. Delegating to an Agency
1. Policy Considerations for Deferring to an Agency
The Supreme Court has recognized that “Congress simply cannot do its
job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”88
The decision to write a statute whose broad phrasing begs for clarification is
inevitably a choice to delegate interpretative authority to the courts or an
agency. In the case of the ACCA, this interpretative authority has rested with
the courts for thirty years. But relative competencies in crafting an immediate and comprehensive solution counsel in favor of shifting this authority to
an expert agency.
The traditional policy rationales for delegating to agencies apply to determining predicate offenses under the ACCA as well. Unlike courts responsible for issuing rulings on a broad array of laws, agencies are able to gain
expertise in a narrow set of issues.89 Proponents of judicial delegation often
argue that courts are more adept than agencies at deciding matters of law,
but this reasoning is not so easily applicable to determining ACCA predicate
offenses. Federal courts lack the capabilities that will inevitably be necessary
to discern whether statutes from other jurisdictions target violent crime.90
Even the most ardent supporters of delegating to courts recognize that the
ACCA predicate offense determination represents a clear situation in which
judges are inferior to experts.91 A body of experts dedicated to analyzing and
cataloguing potentially implicated state laws has an advantage over courts in
clarifying the residual clause’s broad scope.

88. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
89. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624–25 (1935).
90. See, e.g., Spence & Cross, supra note 86, at 140.
91. Compare Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L.
Rev. 363, 397 (1986) (judicial deference to agencies on matters of law is irrational), with
Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (No. 119540) (Justice Breyer asking why the Sentencing Commission cannot “look and see what are
the real behaviors that are convicted under” various statutes), and Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (No. 05-9264) (Justice Breyer suggesting that law professors specializing in economic and statistical analysis should determine
risk of physical injury associated with each offense “instead of sitting here and trying to figure
out something I know nothing about”).
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The ex ante clarity of an ACCA appendix will also bring predictability to
the predicate offense question.92 This comparative advantage would be moot
were federal courts able to write advisory opinions. The judiciary’s measured pace, however, forces courts, prosecutors, and defendants to reason by
analogy from often inconsistent ACCA precedent. Although court rulings
may be less elastic than agency determinations in the long run,93 ACCA judicial decisions are not applicable beyond the specific statute under consideration in the jurisdiction issuing the ruling.94 Thus comprehensive agency
resolution rather than gradual judicial determination will more definitively
resolve the legal question of whether individual statutes are ACCA predicate
offenses.
A popular rationale for judicial delegation is that the adjustment cost of
adhering to an imperfect court rule is preferable to periodic agency revisions.95 An ACCA appendix, however, will need revision only when legislatures tweak the language of existing statutes and add to their states’ criminal
codes. Agencies are able to respond to these changes more efficiently than
courts, which must wait for individual controversies to ripen.96 Whereas
courts are ideal for resolving concrete disputes, sifting through thousands of
state statutes to determine which are violent felonies under the ACCA is a
more systematic undertaking that an agency is better equipped to complete
in reasonable time.
Agencies’ expertise, consistency, and efficiency give them a comparative
advantage over courts in determining ACCA predicate offenses. Leveraging
these competencies to create an ACCA appendix will ultimately alleviate the
current system’s negative consequences.
2. The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Role
Of the federal agencies to which Congress could assign interpretative
authority, the U.S. Sentencing Commission is best positioned to determine
which statutes are ACCA predicate offenses. Even in its diminished role as
an advisory body, the Sentencing Commission has a broad mandate to study
sentencing. Although its capabilities regarding statistical analysis are widely

92. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (framing the value of
agency action as the “uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a
national law requires”).
93. Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and
Agency Interpretation of Title VII, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 363, 379 (2010).
94. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1035, 1045 (2006).
96. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 947, 950–51 (1999) (arguing
that the primary reason for agency delegation is agencies’ ability to respond flexibly to changed
conditions).
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criticized,97 empirical research is not essential to compiling the appendix,98
and there are additional reasons for delegating to the Sentencing
Commission.
The crux of building an ACCA appendix will be qualitatively analyzing
state statutes. The Sentencing Commission’s longtime directive to study federal sentencing has endowed it with the manpower, subject familiarity, and
institutional incentives to do so. More specifically, it has experience reviewing the types of crimes that constitute violent felonies. To calculate criminal
history points under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission defines “crime of violence” in nearly identical terms to “violent
felony” under the ACCA and suggests applicable offenses in its advisory
notes.99 Like the ACCA, the guidelines explicitly consider which prior crime
of violence and controlled substance offenses should enhance the sentences
of offenders who are convicted of being felons in possession.100
The Sentencing Commission is hardly the only agency capable of analyzing state statutes. The DOJ oversees the active Bureau of Justice Statistics,
which collects and analyzes data on a wide range of criminal topics. For
example, its 2006 study on felony sentences in state courts contains data
from 300 counties, including 58 of the nation’s 75 largest.101 The blatant
conflict of interest presented by the DOJ’s responsibility to prosecute
criminals advises against giving it the power to decide the scope of federal
sentencing law. In addition, the DOJ would prefer that the Sentencing Commission make ACCA reform suggestions to Congress.102 This may reflect the
97. See, e.g., Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1631,
1683–85 (2012) (criticizing the commission’s sentencing statistics for failing to account for key
disparities in calculating sentencing ranges); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, On Estimating
Disparity and Inferring Causation: Sur-Reply to the U.S. Sentencing Commission Staff, 123 Yale
L.J. Online 273, 280–86 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1212.pdf (criticizing the commission’s choice of control variables and failure to consider early-stage postarrest factors when analyzing racial disparity).
98. See infra Section III.B.
99. The single difference between the two definitions is that the guidelines qualify burglary as a crime of violence limited to dwellings. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 4B1.2 (2013). This is barely narrower than the generic burglary definition that the Supreme
Court applied to the ACCA—that definition includes a “building or other structure.” Taylor v.
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
100. The guidelines establish the base offense level for unlawful receipt, possession, or
transportation of firearms or ammunition for “prohibited person(s),” which includes offenders convicted under the federal felon in possession statute. USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.3. The guidelines also recommend an enhanced base level if the offender “committed any part of the
instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense.” Id. § 2K2.1(a)(1).
101. Sean Rosenmerkel et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006–Statistical Tables 30 (2010), available at http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
102. Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy and Legislation, Dep’t of
Justice, to Patti Saris, J., Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (July 11, 2013), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20130801/Public_Comment_
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DOJ leadership’s awareness of this conflict. At the very least, the department’s deference indicates its belief that the Sentencing Commission is better positioned to fill this role.
This is not to say that Congress must delegate to the Sentencing Commission if in the future a better implementer emerges or that the Sentencing
Commission is the appropriate agency to make similar determinations in
other contexts where an appendix may be useful. Rather, this Note argues
merely that given its expertise, mandate, and institutional incentives, the
Sentencing Commission is currently the best-positioned federal agency to
populate and maintain an ACCA appendix.
B. Predicate Offenses
Whichever agency Congress assigns the task of determining ACCA predicate offenses will need to settle on a consistent standard for deciding which
statutes belong in the appendix. To lawfully delegate to an agency, Congress
must provide an intelligible principle to which the agency must conform in
making its regulations.103 Even if the ACCA’s definitions of serious drug offense and violent felony are outwardly clear,104 Congress must prescribe, or
the agency will itself need to institute, a substantive standard for determining which statutes are predicate offenses.
Maintaining the categorical approach’s focus on elements rather than
behavior makes the most sense. As the Supreme Court stated in Taylor, Congress ostensibly intended that a particular crime should always count or not
count as an ACCA predicate irrespective of the facts that led to the conviction.105 Even if this were not Congress’s initial intent, the elaborate judicial
probe into individual defendant behavior under a noncategorical standard
would render the ACCA an unconstitutional reach into jury fact-finding.106
In determining ACCA predicate offenses, the agency’s inquiry should be
limited to a qualitative analysis of statutory elements. Fact-specific questions
such as whether a particular defendant committed the crime in a violent way
or whether offenders usually commit the crime in a way that presents a
serious risk of injury are immaterial under a categorical standard where the
only consideration is the statute of conviction. In cases that are easy to resolve, the legal elements of the statute will present a clear risk of injury. In
other cases, it will be equally obvious that there are ways to commit the
crime that could not possibly be dangerous. And in more difficult cases, the
DOJ_Proposed_Priorities.pdf (“We are hopeful the Commission’s work will result in a resolution of [the categorical approach] problem . . . .”).
103. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989).
104. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2277 (2011) (concluding that the ACCA
“states an intelligible principle and provides guidance that allows a person to ‘conform his or
her conduct to the law’ ” (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (plurality
opinion))).
105. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990).
106. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013) (“[A]ny fact that increases
the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.”).

170

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 113:151

agency will be able to consult experts and qualitative statutory information.
This interpretative role is comparable to that of a jury when it must decide
whether a predicate offense to felony murder categorically—rather than frequently—poses a risk of injury.107
In its residual clause line of cases, the Court has sometimes depended
on empirical analysis to decide whether an offense is categorically an ACCA
predicate.108 This reliance is demonstrative of the belief that when a statute’s
potential risk of physical injury is not inherently obvious, determining
whether it is violent is a task better suited for statisticians than sentencing
judges.109 Most evidently, the Court in Chambers heavily relied on data from
a week-old U.S. Sentencing Commission report on federal escape offenses.110
But statistical generalizations about the average risk presented when a
crime is committed should be irrelevant to whether a statute categorically
presents a serious risk of physical injury. An overall high rate of physical
injury correlated with a crime does not speak to the categorical question of
whether the crime’s elements constitute a violent felony. Even if empirical
data could answer this categorical question, the massive research that would
be required to uncover the risk of physical injury posed by idiosyncratic
state statutes would make it an impractical test on which to base the
appendix.
The qualitative standard that this Note proposes is not essential to the
efficacy of an appendix of ACCA crimes—assuming that the agency consistently applies whichever test it adopts. Yet an approach that qualitatively analyzes statutory elements to determine ACCA predicate offenses is
fundamentally fair, comparatively easy to implement, and conforms to the
categorical approach that the Supreme Court mandated.
Finally, the ACCA appendix should be binding. Federal courts will simply need to consult the appendix to determine if prior offenses count as
ACCA predicates.111 This ex ante certainty will alleviate the current system’s
107. See Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 403, 440–49
(2011), for a discussion on the split between jurisdictions that exhaustively enumerate, partially enumerate, and do not enumerate offenses that qualify as predicates to felony murder.
108. E.g., Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274 (“Although statistics are not dispositive, here they
confirm the commonsense conclusion that Indiana’s vehicular flight crime is a violent felony.”); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 206 (2007) (considering U.S. Sentencing Commission data in determining elements of generic burglary).
109. See supra note 91.
110. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128–30 (2009); see also U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (2008),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research_Projects/Escape/200811_
FY_06_07_Escape_Offenses_Report.pdf.
111. A prior conviction is a judicially determinable fact that need not be admitted by the
defendant or proved by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1
(“In Almendarez–Torres . . . we recognized a narrow exception to this general rule for the fact
of a prior conviction. Because the parties do not contest that decision’s vitality, we do not
revisit it for purposes of our decision today.”). But see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13,
27 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
subsequent jurisprudence has nullified the Supreme Court’s carve out in Almendarez–Torres
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ambiguity. A binding appendix does not impact defendants’ ability to challenge facially the reasonableness of an agency’s decision to classify a particular statute as an ACCA predicate offense.112
An appendix will not fix every difficulty in applying the ACCA. In particular, courts will still need to use the modified categorical approach for
statutes that have alternative paths to conviction. Even for these divisible
statutes, the appendix will provide a blueprint for judges by clarifying which
of the statute’s prongs counts toward the ACCA’s enhancement. Judges will
still need to consult documents from the convicting court to determine the
prong under which the defendant was sentenced.113
C. Working with the States
Cooperative federalism will accelerate the expansive endeavor of categorizing each statute in states’ penal codes. This is not unprecedented in the
law enforcement arena. Federal agencies routinely coordinate with the states
to carry out an array of mandates ranging from exchanging narcotics intelligence114 to maintaining a national sex offender registry.115 Sometimes Congress even grants state entities the authority to make interstitial findings for
federal administrative bodies116 and to enforce agency regulations117—responsibilities that will be similar to those of a state agency advising on the
ACCA appendix.
It will be unnecessary for Congress to delegate the entire task of preliminarily cataloguing state criminal statutes to a state agency. The Sentencing
Commission will not need outside direction on the vast majority of laws the
classification of which will be unambiguous and uncontroversial. Even so,
state agencies will play an integral role by providing initial and nonbinding
guidance on many gray-area statutes. Such guidance must include coherent
v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). For preappendix violations, judicial statutory interpretation may still be necessary.
112. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
113. See supra Section I.B.
114. Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Agency, http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/intel.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (“Participating [state] agencies are required to submit active case targeting information . . . .”).
115. The Adam Walsh Act “establishe[d] a comprehensive national system for the registration of [sex] offenders,” 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006), and required that states “maintain a
jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry conforming to the requirements” of the Act’s provisions. Id. § 16912(a). If states fail to comply, the attorney general may withhold 10 percent of
the funds that the jurisdiction would otherwise have received as part of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Id. § 16925(a).
116. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers,
112 Colum. L. Rev. 459, 475 & n.67 (2012) (discussing the requirement in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 that state entities “recommend medical loss ratio standards to the Department of Health and Human Services”).
117. See, e.g., Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law
Through A Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product
Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 165, 191–92 (2010).
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reasoning for each statute so the Sentencing Commission can conduct compliance review to ensure a consistent and accurate standard.118 Under this
approach, the state agency’s role can be analogized to that of state high
courts responding to the U.S. Supreme Court’s certified questions on substantive matters of state law.119
It may seem counterintuitive to assign part of the task of interpreting
the legal meaning of a federal statute to the states, but federal agencies are
not the most suitable actors to deliberate on complicated state statutes that
may or may not qualify as violent felonies. Certain state agencies possess a
comparative advantage because of their familiarity with the inner workings
of idiosyncratic state criminal statutes.120 Although the Sentencing Commission may be able to conduct macrolevel analysis across federal jurisdictions,
a more localized knowledge of the activity that statutes categorically target
will more efficiently achieve an accurate list of ACCA predicate felonies.
Discerning the elements of specific state statutes may also require a sophisticated appreciation of the intricacies of state case law. This is best left to
those with a command of its subtleties and evolution. The Supreme Court
has not seemed averse to lower courts taking relevant judicial rulings into
account when determining the elements of a predicate offense.121 Certainly it
would be prudent to exercise lenity by requiring that the Sentencing Commission make clear that any offense included in the appendix qualifies as a
violent felony.122 It should be uncontroversial, however, that clear direction
on the scope of a statute’s elements from at least the convicting jurisdiction’s
highest court will factor into whether the offense constitutes a violent
felony.
Dictating to the states whether their statutes target criminal activity that
presents a risk of physical injury may create state–federal tension. In the
long run, however, the appendix promotes more respect for state–federal
relations than a system in which federal judges disparately apply state laws
without any guidance from the states. The appendix solution will at least
give the states some input on which of their statutes constitute ACCA predicate offenses. Even if a federal agency is ultimately making this decision,
state participation creates a channel for states to air concerns about the
meaning of their own statutes.
118. See supra Section III.B.
119. See 17A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper &
Vikram David Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp.
2013).
120. See Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 Duke
L.J. 673, 679–84 (2003) (describing states’ comparative advantages in antitrust enforcement);
see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 698, 721
(2011) (listing various advantages of state enforcement of federal law).
121. See, e.g., Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2291 (2013) (“We may reserve
the question whether, in determining a crime’s elements, a sentencing court should take account not only of the relevant statute’s text, but of judicial rulings interpreting it.”).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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Of the various state agencies that could fill this role, state sentencing
commissions are logical partners for many of the same reasons that delegating to the U.S. Sentencing Commission is compelling. Among state actors,
state sentencing commissions are mandated to recommend sentencing adjustments, and they possess unique experience in analyzing state criminal
statutes. Although some commissions reside in the executive and others in
the judiciary, their location has neither been controversial nor had a noticeable impact on their efficacy.123 Equally important, sentencing commissions
are designed as neutral advisory bodies.124 Even some states without dedicated commissions have comparable administrative agencies with mandates
to serve the commission-like function of analyzing statutes and making recommendations for reform.125 Although sentencing commissions are not isolated from political pressure,126 they should have little incentive to report
inaccurately to a federal agency the state statutes that qualify as predicate
offenses in a different jurisdiction. That said, sentencing commissions and
similar bodies may not be a universal cure. Although they may be ideal state
collaborators, some states lack such bodies. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that legislatures will not completely eliminate their states’ sentencing
commissions.127
State attorneys general may also be able to help build the appendix.
Their sensitivity to political factors creates an incentive for them to implement a federal criminal statute that benefits from state assistance.128 Additionally, political ambition may motivate them to champion their role in
enforcing the ACCA.129 Federal laws with state enforcement provisions that
single out attorneys general are not unprecedented. In the field of consumer
123. Robert Weisberg, California’s De Facto Sentencing Commissions, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online 1, 3 (2011), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO1.pdf.
124. See Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commissions Turned Out to Be a Good Idea, 12
Berkeley J. Crim. L. 179, 205–11 (2007).
125. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 8289 (West 2012) (“The commission shall . . . examine
the common law and statutes of the state and judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering
defects and anachronisms in the law and recommending needed reforms.”); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 4.1403 (West 2013) (authorizing state law revision commission to “[e]xamine
the common law and statutes of [the] state and current judicial decisions for the purpose of
discovering defects and anachronisms in the law and recommending needed reforms”); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 1:12A-8 (West 1992) (describing the review duties of the commission to include
remedying defects, reconciling conflicting provisions, clarifying confusing provisions, and excising redundant provisions in the law).
126. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 798–800 (2005).
127. The Wisconsin Sentencing Commission, for example, was eliminated during the
state’s 2007–2009 budget cycle. Neal B. Kauder & Brian J. Ostrom, Nat’l Ctr. for State
Courts, State Sentencing Guidelines: Profiles and Continuum 27 (2008), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/NCSC%20Sentencing%20Guidelines%20profiles%20July%202008.pdf.
128. See Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement,
69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1004, 1036 (2001); see also Lemos, supra note 120, at 701–02.
129. See Widman, supra note 117, at 213 (considering state enforcement of the Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act).
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protection, for example, state attorneys general may sue private actors for
failure to comply with federal standards.130 For states that do not have sentencing commissions, attorneys general are feasible alternative actors with
whom the federal agency can collaborate.
Yet zealous attorneys general may be overinclusive due to the potential
for political fallout from appearing apathetic to crime.131 Congress can try to
counter this possibility ex ante by stipulating that the federal agency reviewing state recommendations will view underinclusion and overinclusion as a
failure to fulfill the delegated responsibility. Constituents who want to resist
the tentacles of the federal system may also deter overinclusion if they perceive it as federal overreach.132 But if attorneys general are under political
pressure to appear tough on crime,133 providing an overinclusive list of statutes that qualify as ACCA predicate offenses is an easy way to create this
impression without having to shoulder the cost of incarcerations resulting
from their own recommendations.
Congress has other ways of incentivizing state actors to provide an accurate list of statutes. It currently induces the states to engage in a number of
law enforcement programs by conditioning federal funding on competent
state participation.134 State actors are unsurprisingly responsive to this approach, especially when the amount of federal assistance involved is substantial.135 The healthy fear of appearing inept or indifferent to crime can serve
as an important motivating tool when receiving sizeable federal grants depends on competent state collaboration.
For example, anchoring a federal initiative that requires state assistance
to Justice Assistance Grant funding has been used in other contexts.136 For
state and local jurisdictions, these grants are “critical [for] a range of program areas including law enforcement, prosecution, indigent defense,
courts, crime prevention and education, corrections and community corrections, drug treatment and enforcement, planning, evaluation, technology
improvement, and crime victim and witness initiatives.”137 Even though
130. Lemos, supra note 120, at 708–09.
131. See id. at 730 n.145.
132. See id. at 722.
133. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
505, 533–40 (2001).
134. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 51, 52 (2008) (noting the success of “strategic use of honey” as an
incentive to secure state participation in federal criminal justice programs); Michael M.
O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 783, 806–07 (2004) (although the
federal government does not require state participation in implementing drug policy, it
“utilizes grants and other incentives” successfully to encourage state participation).
135. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1174 (1995).
136. See, e.g., supra note 115.
137. Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, Bureau of Just. Assistance, https://www.
bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=59 (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
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much of this funding does not directly contribute to the budgets of the attorneys general, the interconnectedness of the criminal justice system creates
an incentive for them to promote the efficiency of—and therefore protect a
substantial funding source for—other state offices that receive these grants.
D. Other Agency Delegation Solutions
This Note’s proposed solution is not the first argument in favor of delegating the ACCA’s interpretation to an agency. In his Chambers dissent, Justice Alito suggested that “the only tenable, long-term solution is for
Congress to formulate a specific list of expressly defined crimes that are
deemed worthy of the ACCA’s sentencing enhancement.”138 Echoing this
sentiment, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Sykes, complained that
Congress “could have defined violent felonies by compiling a list of specific
covered offenses” before he concluded that the residual clause nonetheless
states an intelligible principle.139 Proposals for ACCA overhaul have similarly
recommended that either Congress or an administrative body construct a
list of qualifying generic crimes.140
Yet these proposals merely postpone rather than resolve the problem of
applying the ACCA. The categorical approach requires courts to focus on
each statute’s individual elements rather than on a hypothetical and idealized form of the offense.141 Even if Congress compiled a list of generic crimes
that per se qualify as ACCA predicate offenses, the categorical approach requires courts to analyze statutes. The Supreme Court’s recent foray into
lower court disagreement on different burglary statutes, for example, illustrates the incompleteness of simply enumerating general crimes.142 Statutory
idiosyncrasies prevent generalizable offense categories from doing much
work for courts, which must inevitably scrutinize individual elements.143 In
addition, if one of the ACCA’s goals is to ensure that “every armed felon . . .
know[s] which of his prior felonies could serve to increase his sentence,”144
providing a list of the platonic forms of generic predicate offenses will engender a false sense of clarity.
Listing applicable crime categories is not incompatible with this Note’s
proposal to compile an appendix of all predicate statutes. Were Congress to
138. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 134 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
139. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2277 (2011).
140. E.g., Hutchison et al., supra note 34, § 4B1.2, at 1357 (suggesting that the Sentencing Commission could “alleviate” confusion by “providing a list of which common offenses
are, or are not, covered by [the] ‘otherwise clause’ ”); Nash, supra note 57.
141. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2289 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The Court does not] proceed by
exploring whether some platonic form of an offense . . . satisfies ACCA’s residual clause.”).
142. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
143. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 27, Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276
(2013) (No. 11-9540) (Justice Breyer noting that the number of state statutes “that are sort of
like something, but not completely like something is in the thousands”).
144. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2277.
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do so, a federal agency could then assemble an ACCA appendix of statutes
that constitute crimes on that list. Although Congress has been resistant to
further enumeration that would moderate the ACCA’s scope,145 taking this
step would make compiling the appendix a smaller-scale endeavor. Regardless of whether Congress follows Justice Alito’s advice, the appendix proposal stands on its own.
E. Resolving Related Issues
Although this Note focuses on the ACCA, Congress should require the
Sentencing Commission to use the appendix to resolve other closely related
issues. For example, the Sentencing Commission’s own Federal Sentencing
Guidelines use the term “crime of violence” to calculate criminal history
points—and its definition is nearly identical to that of a violent felony under
the ACCA.146 Yet some courts justify a broader reading of the guidelines
definition by pointing to accompanying commentary suggesting that it may
reach some offenses that do not satisfy the Supreme Court’s fluctuating definition of an ACCA violent felony.147 Unsurprisingly, however, most courts
prefer to consider the two definitions of a violent crime as coterminous.148
Yet their interchangeability ultimately depends on the Court’s unpredictable
definition of a violent felony under the ACCA.149
It would be illogical for the Sentencing Commission to undertake the
enormous task of cataloguing ACCA violent felonies without also resolving
closely related issues such as which state felony statutes qualify as violent
crimes under the guidelines. Settling the latter issue will require answering
questions outside of this Note’s scope. For example, the Sentencing Commission would need to determine whether the ACCA appendix’s standard
should be applied in designating state statutes as crimes of violence under
the guidelines. Yet the larger issue of clarifying which statutes count toward
145. See supra notes 85–86.
146. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.1–.2 (2013); supra note 99. Although the guidelines present a clear example of potential definitional overlap with the
ACCA—and one with wide-ranging impact—this is not the only place where the ambiguous
term “crime of violence” impacts criminal defendants. See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 3142 (2012) (conviction for a crime of violence creates a rebuttable presumption that
no set of conditions short of pretrial defendant detention will ensure community safety). Although examining each of these examples is outside of this Note’s scope, Congress could presumably use the ACCA appendix to provide definitional clarity to other areas of federal
criminal law that use similar crime categories.
147. Amy Baron-Evans et al., Deconstructing the Career Offender Guideline, 2 Charlotte
L. Rev. 39, 72 (2010).
148. E.g., United States v. Wyatt, 672 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2012) (analyzing the ACCA
and guidelines definitions coterminously); United States v. Coronado, 603 F.3d 706, 709 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing “agreement” between “every circuit that has had occasion” to compare the
guidelines and ACCA definitions of violent felony).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 438–39 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting a shift
in the Supreme Court’s residual clause jurisprudence from Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.
137 (2008), to Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011), and analyzing a prior conviction
for possession of a short-barreled shotgun under the latter’s standard).
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the guidelines’s career-offender designation is an area of uncertainty that
Congress could readily resolve with the ACCA appendix.
Even outside of the criminal context, federal courts must determine the
scope of a crime of violence, and the ACCA appendix can help in doing so.
The Department of Homeland Security, for example, requires applicants for
naturalized citizenship to establish their good moral character, which they
cannot do if they have an aggravated felony conviction.150 An aggravated
felony within immigration law includes a “crime of violence,”151 which is
distinct from the ACCA’s definition.152 It has been widely noted that an especially confusing aspect of this complex area of law is predicting whether a
conviction for a particular offense will render an alien deportable.153 The
immigration definition is more expansive than the ACCA’s in that it also
includes physical force against another’s property. It is narrower than the
ACCA’s definition, however, in that conduct in which the “substantial risk
that physical force . . . may be used”154 is less inclusive than “conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.”155
Yet some courts have held that the two statutes are sufficiently similar to
merit treating them interchangeably.156 These courts have relied on the purposeful, violent, and aggressive language from Begay to hold that an ACCA
violent felony is indistinguishable from a crime of violence in the immigration context.157 But this justification is complicated by the Sykes Court’s declaration that purposeful, violent, and aggressive has no “precise textual link”
to the ACCA’s residual clause158 and is therefore potentially not determinative of a crime’s classification as a violent felony. Either Congress should
declare that the definitions are identical and apply to the same state statutes
or clarify the substantive difference between them. It would make little sense
to leave this issue unresolved when the Sentencing Commission compiles an
appendix of state statutes that probably applies here as well.
150. Permanent Bars to GMC – USCIS Policy Manual – Volume 12, Part F, Chapter 4, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManualVolume12-PartF-Chapter4.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014).
151. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2012).
152. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) (immigration law definition), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (ACCA definition).
153. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1488–89 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 16.
155. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
156. E.g., United States v. Castleman, 695 F.3d 582, 586 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The provisions’
similarity supports the inference that Congress intended them to capture offenses criminalizing identical degrees of force.”), rev’d, No. 12-1371, 2014 WL 1225196 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2014);
United States v. White, 606 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding “little, if any, distinction
between the ‘physical force’ element[s]” of the two definitions).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777, 789 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Following
Begay, it is unclear whether there is any meaningful difference between the two risk-based
approaches . . . .”).
158. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275 (2011).
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Even if Congress fails to resolve these definitional questions, comprehensively defining the scope of a violent felony in the ACCA context can
provide clarity in other ways. Federal courts already consult case law commenting on the ACCA when considering the scope of other violent crime
language. An appendix that definitively indicates whether the conviction in
question was for an ACCA predicate offense will have even more probative
force.
Lastly, the appendix will have greater influence in collateral contexts if
the Sentencing Commission indicates why each statute was included. The
appendix should differentiate between statutes that qualify as violent felony
predicate offenses because of an element that includes the use of physical
force and those statutes that present a serious risk of physical injury. At the
very least, bracketing physical force predicates will serve as a dispositive indicator of a violent crime conviction under the Sentencing Guidelines’s identical language159 and for nonproperty violent crimes in the immigration
context.160
Conclusion
Creating and maintaining an exhaustive appendix of every state statute
that qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense will be a significant undertaking.
Yet Congress shows no signs of ending its use of broadly categorized convictions from other jurisdictions to answer federal legal questions. In contrast
to the current approach of statute-by-statute judicial interpretation, a comprehensive administrative solution would eliminate unjust intercourt disparity, streamline enforcement for courts, reduce the costs of debating the
ACCA’s scope for prosecutors and defendants, and give fair warning to those
considering committing certain crimes and contemplating plea offers. Such
a solution will also better serve the goal of using a harsh penalty to deter
violent crime. There is likely to be disagreement over which federal and state
agencies should be involved in this process as well as over the proper governing standard for determining predicate offenses. In addition to recommending reform of the ACCA, this Note could also serve as a template for a
broader discussion on how best to use agencies to provide comprehensive
guidance on convictions from other jurisdictions.

159. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1) (2013).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).

